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ABSTRACT: In the light of the renewed general interest for environmental issues 
resulting from the launch of the European Green Deal by President Von der Leyen, the 
article explores how the EU Commission could promote environmental considera-
tions in the implementation of competition policy. More in detail, starting from the 
role currently played by environmental factors in the assessment of anticompetitive 
agreements, the article will consider whether Article 101 TFEU, as formulated – read 
in the light of the Commission’s decisional practice and of the ECJ’s case law – would 
support a broader interpretation according to which the importance of environment-
related considerations would be increased, in line with the expectations of President 
Von der Leyen. 
For this purpose, the present analysis will be focused on the first and third paragraphs 
of Article 101 TFEU, both already used in the past by the Commission – although on 
the basis of a different legal reasoning – in order to support the relevance of policy 
considerations (including those environment-related) within competition assessment.
The results of such analysis will show that there is enough room for a change in the 
approach of the Commission that could (and should) be followed at national level. If 
such approach is effectively adopted, the role played by environmental considerations 
in the implementation of competition policy could be immediately enhanced with no 
need to wait for the adoption of a specific legislative act (or, even worse, for a Treaty 
amendment).
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Introduction
On December 11, 2019 the European Commission officially launched the 
“European Green Deal”, the ambitious programme strongly promoted by 
President Van der Leyen to “transform the EU into a fair and prosperous 
society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where 
there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where eco-
nomic growth is decoupled from resource use”1. 
Given the relevance of the objective, it has been requested that “all EU 
actions and policies […] contribute to the European Green Deal”2. An 
exhortation to which competition law could not have escaped: therefore, it 
is not surprising that immediately after the Commission’s Communication, 
the issue of how competition law should contribute to the Green Deal has 
been (and it still is) widely debated at political level3.
This article aims to contribute to such debate, exploring the instruments 
that – under the current legal framework – are already at the Commission’s 
disposal for strengthening the role played by environmental considera-
tions in the implementation of competition policy4, and in particular in 
1 Communication from the Commission, The European Green Deal, COM (2019) 640 final, p. 2.
2 Ibid.
3 As reported by MLex, the Commissioner for Industrial Policy has expressed its favour for a 
change of the current legislation in order to adapt it to the future challenges, highlighting that 
“European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and EU lawmakers  share the ‘wish to 
make competition rules evolve in light of what was pledged with the Green Deal, the digital transi-
tion and with the new geopolitical balance of power’”: see Arezki Yaïche, “Adapting EU antitrust 
rules to climate change, global threats is shared objective, Breton says”, Mlex, 28 January 2020; 
others, such as the new DG of DG Comp has expressed his preference for maintaining the current 
legal framework, provided that “each time the EU has an assertive policy – either on industry, envi-
ronment or finance – the policies conducted by the European Commission, including competition 
law, have supported the EU within the limits of the law”, see Arezki Yaïche, “Competition law 
overhaul did not need to support EU industrial strategy, Guersent says”, Mlex, 21 January 2020.
4 The issue is quite sensitive since, as reported by Rinaldo Brau and Carlo Carraro, “a conflict 
between environmental policies and competition policy may occur. Indeed, the two policies may 
have conflicting objectives if the adoption of [voluntary agreements] and the consequent environ-
mental benefits are associated with reduced competition within the industry. In other words, if a 
[voluntary agreement] is the optimal environmental policy tool to deal with a given environmental 
problem, an environmental regulator may prefer a concentrated industry structure in which the 
[voluntary agreement] can more easily be implemented and is likely to be more effective. But a 
competition authority may not accept to trade-off the environmental benefits of the [voluntary 
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the assessment – according to Article 101 TFEU – of anticompetitive agree-
ments capable of bringing benefits to the environment5. Examining the 
current room for manoeuvre of the Commission in the interpretation of 
Article 101 TFEU appears essential in order to understand the responsive-
ness of the Commission in the implementation of the Green Deal. Indeed, 
if a change in Article 101 TFEU turns out to be necessary, the pursuit of the 
environmental objectives would necessarily require more time, due to the 
complex procedures to be followed for amending the Treaty6.
The article will be structured as follows: after a brief description of the 
evolution of the role attributed to environmental policies in the Treaties, 
the focus will be on how this kind of agreements has been assessed under 
Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU, in order to understand whether these provi-
sions – in the light of their wording, the Commission’s decisional practice 
and the ECJ’s case law – can support the transition to a “greener” approach 
to competition law. 
agreement] with the economic costs possibly induced by a concentrated industry”: see Rinaldo 
Brau and Carlo Carraro, “Are voluntary agreements a threat to competition?”, in Environmental 
Voluntary Approaches: Research Insights for Policy-Makers, eds. Charles J. Highley and François 
Lévêque (Milan: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2001), 46-47.
5 The reference is particularly to environmental agreements, i.e. “those by which stakehold-
ers undertake to achieve pollution abatement, as defined by environmental law, or environ-
mental objectives set out in Article [191 TFEU]”: see Communication from the Commission, 
Environmental Agreements at Community Level Within the Framework of the Action Plan on 
the Simplification and Improvement of the Regulatory Environment, COM(2002) 412, p. 4. As 
highlighted by OFT, “Agreements between firms may be particularly appealing to policy makers 
as they may help achieve policy goals without the requirement of government legislation or explicit 
regulation. Such agreements have the potential of allowing firms to pursue actions that secure 
beneficial environmental outcomes in as efficient a way as possible”: see OECD, Contribution to 
the OECD Policy Roundtable on Horizontal Agreements in the Environmental Context 2010 (24 
November 2011), http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/49139867.pdf (accessed on May 1, 
2020). Se also Simon Holmes, “Climate change, sustainability, and competition law”, Journal of 
Antitrust Enforcement 8, no. 2 (2020): 367, who observed that “Agreement amongst competitors 
is a way of ‘levelling the playing field’ on the basis of costs that reflect the true costs of production 
[i.e. including environmental costs]. To the extent that this encourages others to compete on this 
basis (ie. on a fully cost or true cost basis) it can be seen as pro-competitive, rather than restrictive 
of competition”.
6 See Art. 48 TEU.
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1. Environmental protection in the Treaties
Unlike competition provisions – which have always been present in the 
Treaties – EU’s environmental policy has a more recent history7. The first 
provisions dedicated to the protection of the environment were in fact only 
introduced by the Single European Act in 19878. Such provisions on the 
one hand recognised that “environmental protection requirements shall 
be a component of the Union’s other policies” (Article 130 r), while on 
the other hand, and for the first time, they offered a specific legal basis 
for the adoption of environmental legislation (Article 130 s). Subsequently, 
EU’s environmental policy was further strengthened under the Maastricht 
Treaty, which inserted among the aims of the Community (art. 2 EC) a 
reference to environmental protection9 and – with the aim of ensuring 
that the environment would have been taken into “genuine account […] in 
the definition and implementation of other policies”10 – amended Article 
130 r by substituting the expression “shall be a component of” with “must 
be integrated”11. The Amsterdam Treaty, then, highlighted the impor-
tance of environmental considerations even more, regarding the promo-
tion of a “high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment” as a Community objective (article 2 EC), while moving the 
7 As explained by Francis Jacobs, “The role of the European Court of Justice in the protection of 
the environment”, Journal of Environmental Law 18, no. 2 (2006): 185-186, “that lacuna may be 
explained by the fact that, first, the original Treaties were mainly concerned with the realisation of 
a common market, that is, market integration through the free circulation of factors of production 
and, second, at the time of their signature, environmental concerns did not constitute a priority 
in the political agenda”.
8 Before 1987, the only (indirect) reference to the environment was contained in Article 36 of 
the Treaty of Rome (now Article 36 TFEU), which considers “the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants” as an express derogation to the principle of free movement of goods. 
However, this does not mean that before 1987 environmental issues were totally ignored: from 
a legislative point of view, EC Institutions adopted acts in this field on the basis of the flexibil-
ity clause (now Article 352 TFEU), and this choice was upheld by the Court: see judgment of 7 
February 1985, Procureur de la Republique v. ADBHU, C-240/83, EU:C:1985:59, paragraph 13, 
where the adoption of a waste-oil disposal directive on the basis of Article 352 TFEU was consid-
ered justified since “environmental protection […] is one of the community’s essential objectives”.
9 The insertion made in Article 2 EC reads as follows: “The promotion, throughout the Community, 
of a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflation-
ary growth respecting the environment”. 
10 European Commission, Submission to the IGC Conf-UP 1761/91, April 10, 1991, p. 3.
11 According to the Commission, the original wording made unclear “the practical implications” 
of the provision, which gave the idea to “record a fact rather than imposing an obligation” (Id., p. 5).
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integration obligation from the title dedicated to the environment to the 
“Principles” section (article 3c EC).
The Lisbon Treaty has taken all the mentioned legislative evolutions 
into account. On the one hand it includes among the objectives of the 
Community “the sustainable development of Europe, based on […] a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment” 
(art. 3 TEU), on the other it maintains a policy-linking clause in the sec-
tion dedicated to “provisions having general application”, stating as fol-
lows: “environmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, 
in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development” (art. 11 
TFEU)12. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a “super-integration 
clause”13, requiring the Union to “ensure consistency between its policies 
and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance 
with the principle of conferral of powers” (art. 7 TFEU), and made the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights14, which has its own integration clause 
(art. 37 TFEU)15, which recalls the wording of Article 11 TFEU16, binding 
for both EU Institutions and Member States.
12 Other policy-linking clauses related to the environment are those of Articles 13 TFEU (animal 
welfare) and 194(2) TFEU (environmental integration principle for the Union’s energy policy).
13 The expression is used by Hans Vedder, “The Treaty of Lisbon and European environmental law 
and policy”, Journal of Environmental Law 22, no. 2 (July 2010): 289.
14 According to Article 6 TEU, “the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties”.
15 Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007 C 303/1. According to Article 37, “a high level of envi-
ronmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated 
into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable develop-
ment”. As noted by Ludwig Kramer, “Giving a voice to the environment by challenging the prac-
tice of integrating environmental requirements into other EU policies” in European perspectives on 
environmental law and governance, ed. Suzanne Kingston (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 91 “There 
is no obligation comparable to Article 37 placed on the EU institutions in the transport, agricul-
ture, fisheries or competition areas. Rather, the environmental sector stands out with regard to all 
other sectors of EU policy: indeed, it is, together with the sectors of social and consumer policy, the 
only ones which are mentioned in the Charter. And with regard to these two other sectors, it is the 
only one where the Charter states that its objectives shall be pursued in order to reach sustainable 
development”.
16 Other references to the protection of the environment can be found in Articles 2 and 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, which – according to Article 6 TEU – represent general 
principles of the Union’s law.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   143 28/10/2020   23:06:54
144  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 139-167
The set of environmental provisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty17 
represents an important tool to ensure that environmental issues are taken 
into account in the policy-making stage. However, it has been (and still is) 
strongly debated whether such provisions would bind EU Institutions and 
Member States in the implementation of single policies (such as competi-
tion policy). Indeed, some scholars have excluded the application of the 
integration principle in the implementation of competition policies (both 
at EU and national level), considering that neither article 3 TEU nor the 
various policy-linking clauses would have direct effect18, and therefore 
it would be “inappropriate to use another provision [such as Article 101 
TFEU] to indirectly create those same rights and obligations”19; others, 
instead, have reached the opposite conclusion, on the basis of the argu-
ment that, even considering Article 11 TFEU deprived of direct effect20, its 
importance in the interpretation of a directly effective provision, such as 
Article 101 TFEU, cannot be ignored21. 
17 Other provisions concerning the environment are contained in Title XX of the TFEU (articles 
191-193), in Article 21 (according to which external action has to “foster the sustainable economic, 
social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicat-
ing poverty; [and] help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of 
the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure 
sustainable development”), and in Article 4 TFEU, which lists the environment among the areas 
on which Member States and the Union have a shared competence.
18 See, in particular, Okeoghene Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: The Scope of 
Article 81 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter VII, and Okeoghene Odudu, “The 
wider concerns of competition law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30, no. 3 (2010): 599-613. In 
this regard, the Author mentions judgment of 29 September 1987, Zaera v. Instituto Nacional de 
la Seguridad Social, C-126/86, EU:C:1987:395, paragraph 11 (where the Court seems to exclude 
the possibility for Article 2 EC to create rights or obligations for individuals) and judgment of 4 
March 2010, Commission v. France, C-197/08, EU:C:2010:111, paragraphs 53-54 (where the Court 
held that policy linking clauses had to be considered “when the Union legislates, rather than when 
Union legislation is enforced”).
19 See Odudu, The Boundaries, 167.
20 However, AG Cosmas has considered that the integration clause “appears to impose on the 
Community institutions a specific and clear obligation which could be deemed to produce direct 
effect in the Community legal order”: see Opinion of AG Cosmas of 23 September 1997, Greenpeace 
International v. Commission, C-321/95P, EU:C:1997:421, paragraph 62.
21 See, in this regard, Julian Nowag, Environmental Integration in Competition and Free Movement 
Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 36 according to which “an exemption in cases of 
environmental benefits is not based on Article 11 TFEU but on Article 101(3) TFEU, so that Article 
11 TFEU would not be directly effective. Instead, Article 101(3) TFEU is interpreted in the light of 
Article 11 TFEU, which does not bestow direct effect on Article 11 TFEU but is a form of internal 
indirect effect”: and “in cases of indirect effect, the provision is not required to fulfil the conditions 
for direct effect as established [by the ECJ]”.
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In such doctrinal debate, the case law seems to support this latter opin-
ion, thus attributing a role to the integration principle (and in particular to 
Article 11 TFEU) even in the implementation of competition policies. The 
first attempt in this direction was made by AG Jacobs in Preussen Elektra, 
stating that “as its wording shows, Article [11 TFEU] is not merely program-
matic; it imposes legal obligations”22. The scope of such legal obligation 
was then clarified in two subsequent ECJ decisions: in British Aggregates 
(concerning State aid), the Court confirmed that Article 11 TFEU requires 
“environmental protection [to be] integrated into Community policies […] 
includ[ing] competition policy”23, thus confirming that competition law is 
not immune from environmental issues; in Stim, the General Court fur-
ther specified that the integration required by the policy-linking clauses 
(in that case, the cultural integration clause, but the same reasoning would 
also apply if other policy-linking clauses were considered24) is not limited 
to the policy-making stage, but extends to the implementing decisions 
adopted by the competent Institutions25. Similarly, even competition deci-
sions adopted by NCAs are subject to the integration principle. This con-
clusion is confirmed by the case law, since in the Concordia Bus case the 
ECJ already considered Article 11 TFEU applicable in relation to a Member 
State measure implementing EU law26. In addition, the circumstance that 
22 See Opinion of AG Jacobs of 26 October 2000, PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG, C-379/98, 
EU:C:2000, paragraph 231.
23 See judgment of 22 December 2008, British Aggregates v. Commission, C-487/06P, EU:C:2008:757, 
paragraph 73. See, in similar terms, Jean-Francois Pons (former Deputy-Director General of 
DG Competition), European Competition policy for the recycling markets, 20 September 2001: 
“Community law provides that environmental considerations must be integrated into all other 
Community policies. This includes European competition”.
24 It should be pointed out that Article 11 is the only policy linking clause that is construed with a 
“must be” (instead of a “shall be”): see, in this regard, Kramer, “Giving a voice”, 84, according to 
whom “the wording of Article 11 TFEU establishes a requirement (‘must be’). It does not invite the 
addressees to deploy best efforts (‘shall aim to’) to reach integration, or to consider (‘shall be taken 
into account’; ‘shall take care’) the integration of environmental requirements. Rather, the instruc-
tion given by the Treaty is absolute and clear”.
25 See judgment of 12 April 2013, Stim v. Commission, T-451/08, EU:T:2013:189, paragraph 103: 
“The [cultural integration clause] implies only that it is necessary to bear in mind the requirements 
relating to the respect for and promotion of cultural diversity when considering the four condi-
tions for the application of Article 81(3) EC, in particular as regards the condition relating to the 
indispensable nature of the restriction”.
26 See judgment of 17 September 2002, Concordia Bus v. Helsingin kaupunki, C-513/99, 
EU:C:2002:495, paragraph 57, where the ECJ concluded that “in the light of […] the wording of […] 
Article 6 EC [now Article 11 TFEU], which lays down that environmental protection requirements 
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of Community policies and activities, 
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the integration principle is nowadays also enshrined in Article 37 of the 
Charter – which is binding upon Member States in the implementation of 
EU policies27 – represents a further element confirming the relevance of 
such principle even at a national level.
Finally, in terms of general policy – as observed by C. Townley – even 
admitting that environmental objectives could be achieved more effi-
ciently using other policy instruments (for instance, environmental laws/
regulation), “there might be practical reasons (at least in the short term) 
why the best way of achieving certain ends at a given moment in time is by 
distorting competition”28.
In conclusion, the integration clause and the other policy-linking clauses 
oblige the enforcer (at the very least) to take into consideration environ-
mental issues in the context of the adoption of competition decisions29.
Based on such assumption30, the next paragraphs will be dedicated to 
the illustration of the role played (and that could be reasonably and argu-
ably be played in the future) by environmental issues in the assessment of 
anticompetitive agreements under article 101 TFEU.
it must be concluded that Article 36(1)(a) of Directive 92/50 does not exclude the possibility for the 
contracting authority of using criteria relating to the preservation of the environment when assess-
ing the economically most advantageous tender”.
27 According to Article 51 of the Charter, the provisions of the latter are addressed also “to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the 
rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respec-
tive powers”.
28 See Christopher Townley, Article 81 EC and public policy (Oxford: Hart publishing, 2009), 40.
29 However, this does not mean that environmental considerations should always prevail over other 
policies: see in this regard the Opinion of AG Geelhoed of 26 January 2006, Austria v. Parliament 
and Council, C-161/04, EU:C:2006:66, paragraph 59 and the Opinion of AG Bot of 8 May 2013, 
Essent Belgium v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, C-204/12, 
EU:C:2014:2192, paragraph 97, both highlighting that Article 11 TFEU (as well as Article 37 of 
the Charter) has to be regarded as an obligation on the part of EU institutions to take due account 
of ecological interests in policy areas outside that of environmental protection stricto sensu, that 
should therefore be balanced against the other EU policies. Against these conclusions see Suzanne 
Kingston, Greening EU competition law and policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
113-114 who suggests that “environmental protection requirements should be applied at all times 
in priority to all other potentially conflicting objectives”.
30 An assumption that has been criticised by Giuliano Amato in Antitrust and the Bounds of Power 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997), 117 – who argued that antitrust had to be “liberalised” from 
objectives extraneous to it (such as industrial policies and regional policies), and Odudu, The 
Boundaries, 159 according to whom the attainment of non-efficiency goals was a “constitutional 
question external to competition law that ultimately requires resolution at the constitutional level”.
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2. Excluding the agreement from the scope of application of Article 101(1)
A first way to integrate environmental issues in competition assessments is 
by making a balance in the context of Article 101(1) TFEU and – provided 
that some conditions are fulfilled – excluding the agreement under assess-
ment from the scope of application of competition law. The Commission 
has already made use of this possibility in the past, which has however 
been subjected to strict requirements. Thus, in order to understand how 
the balancing works, it appears appropriate to briefly recall ECJ rulings in 
Albany and Wouters.
In Albany, the ECJ examined the phenomenon of collective bargaining, 
reaching the conclusion that agreements between organisations represent-
ing employers and workers aiming at improving employment and working 
conditions do not fall within Article 101 TFEU “by virtue of their nature 
and purpose”31. More in detail, the Court found a conflict between one of 
the objectives of the Treaty – i.e. the social policy, mentioned in Article 
137 EC – and competition provisions, since “the social policy objectives 
pursued by [collective] agreements would be seriously undermined if 
management and labour were subject to Article 85(1) [now Article 101 (1)] 
of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve condi-
tions of work and employment”: in this scenario, “an interpretation of the 
provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is both effective and consist-
ent” required to consider such agreements “as falling outside the scope of 
Article 85(1) [now Article 101 (1)] of the Treaty”32. 
If in Albany the Court adopted a more radical approach – excluding the 
agreement from the scope of Article 101 TFEU in the light of the need to 
pursue another EU objective33 – in Wouters the ECJ made a slightly differ-
31 See judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany International BV. v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430. Similar conclusions were reached in other cases 
implying social policy considerations: see, inter alia, judgment of 21 September 1999, Brentjens’ 
Handelsonderneming BV. v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen, 
C-115-117/97, EU:C:1999:434; judgment of 12 September 2000, Pavlov. and Others, C-180 and 
184/98, EU:C:2000:428. More recently, the ECJ has further expanded the scope of Albany, rec-
ognising the non-application of competition law also to those arrangements concluded by “false 
self-employed” workers: see in this regard judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV. Kunsten Informatie 
en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13, EU:C:2014:2411.
32 See judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany International BV. v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds 
Textielindustrie, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430, paragraphs 59 and 60.
33 The solution of the ECJ has been criticised by Stefano Boni and Pietro Manzini, “National social 
legislation and EC antitrust law”, World Competition 24, no. 2 (2001): 242, according to whom the 
Court – disregarding the application of competition policy – showed to make no “efforts to reach 
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ent reasoning. The Court – called to assess whether a Regulation adopted 
by the Bar of Netherlands that prohibited any multi-disciplinary partner-
ships between members of the Bar and accountants breached article 101 
TFEU – concluded that “not every agreement between undertakings or 
every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the free-
dom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the 
prohibition laid down in Article [101](1) of the Treaty. For the purposes of 
application of that provision to a particular case, account must first of all 
be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of 
undertakings was taken or produces its effects. More particularly, account 
must be taken of its objectives, […] [assessing] whether the consequen-
tial effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those 
objectives”34. 
It is not clear whether in Wouters the Court affirmed the application 
– at least in principle – of Article 101 TFEU to the agreement (before con-
cluding for its non-application in the light of the specific circumstances)35; 
however, both cases36 show that the ECJ considers possible the exemption 
a balance between them. Manifestly, this hermeneutic attitude runs counter to the interpretative 
principle of effet utile, according to which a meaning must be recognised to the provisions of a 
treaty”.
34 See judgment of 19 February 2002, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse 
Belastingadviseurs BV. v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: 
Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap, C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98: in that case, the public 
policy goal that the Netherland Bar Regulation intended to reach was a Member State goal (i.e. 
the administration of justice); however, the same reasoning was followed by the Court when a 
Community goal had to be pursued: for instance, in judgment of 18 July 2006, David Meca-Medina 
and Igor Majcen v. Commission of the European Communities, C-519/04, EU:C:2006:492, the meas-
ure was justified by the need to combat doping in order for competitive sport to be conducted fairly 
(§ 43).
35 This is for example the opinion of Nowag, Environmental integration, 220 ff. who made a distinc-
tion between Wouters – where the application of competition law was excluded on the basis of a 
proportionality test – and Albany, where the Court excluded at all the application of competition 
law; similarly, Edith Loozen, “Professional ethics and restraints of competition”, European Law 
Review 31, no. 1 (2006): footnote 29 observed that in Albany the Court determined that collective 
agreements fall outside article 101(1), while in Wouters the Court “does not determine that the 
1993 Regulation falls outside the scope of Art. 81 EC as such. In principle, Art. 81(1) EC applies”.
36 Some commentators have distinguished between the two cases: for instance, Giorgio Monti, 
“Article 81 EC and public policy”, Common Market Law Review 39, no. 5 (2002) differentiates 
between the ancillary restraint (Albany) and the application of the “Cassis de Dijon formula” 
(Wouters); J.W. van de Gronden and K.J.M. Mortelmans, “Wouters: is het beroep van advocaat een 
aparte tak van sport?”, Ars Aequi 51 (2002): 459 distinguish instead between inherent restrictions 
– i.e. restrictions which are considered necessary (inherent) and appropriate for the functioning of 
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from the application of competition law for agreements that: i) pursue one 
of the objectives of the Treaties (such as the improvement of working con-
ditions) or, at least, a public interest objective (such as the administration 
of justice); and ii) generate a restriction of competition that is “inherent” to 
the agreement, such as collective bargaining37. 
The reasoning followed by the Court in such cases appears therefore to 
be the same of that developed in the field of free movement (starting from 
Cassis de Dijon case38)39. This means that when it is faced with an obsta-
cle to the free movement (of goods) indistinctly applicable to national and 
non-national products40, the ECJ has to investigate whether the restric-
tion is necessary to satisfy a mandatory requirement and appears to be 
proportionate41. 
a certain organisation, system or sector – and mixed inherent restrictions, i.e. restrictions which 
are necessary for the general interest.
37 Interestingly enough, Monti, “Article 81”, 1090 believes that applying Wouters case law means 
only that “the measure in question cannot be challenged as a matter of Community law, but this 
cannot immunize the measure from the competition law of the Member State where the measure 
is implemented”.
38 See judgment of 20 February 1979, Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, C-120/78, 
EU:C:1979:42.
39 In this context, it is relevant that in Wouters the Court expressly relied on Reisburo Broede 
(judgment of 12 December 1996, Reisebüro Broede v. Gerd Sandker, C-3/95, EU:C:1996:487) con-
cerning the regulation of the legal profession in the context of Article 56 TFEU (freedom to pro-
vide services). However, it should be observed that in other circumstances the Tribunal has con-
sidered the case law on freedom of establishment and on freedom to provide services irrelevant in 
the context of Article 101(1) TFEU: see judgment of 28 March 2001, Institut des mandataires agréés 
v. Commission, T-144/99, EU:T:2001:105, paragraph 66.
40 It should also be recalled that the ECJ, in PreussenElektra (judgment of 13 March 2001, 
PreussenElektra AG v. Schhleswag AG, C-379/98, EU:C:2001:160) and Walloon Waste (judg-
ment of 9 July 1992, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium, C-2/90, 
EU:C:1992:310), has justified (although not explicitly) the application of distinctly applicable meas-
ures on the basis of environmental considerations, even though such kind of measures could be 
only justified on the basis of express derogations of Article 36 TFEU.
41 As noted by Julio Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic 
Constitutional Law of the European Community (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), 1 competition 
and free movement rules are the “oldest layer of the Community constitution” and should “not be 
seen as isolated and independent groups of norms, but rather as inextricably linked in a functional 
sense”. The existence of a (partial) convergence between competition law and free movement rules 
has been highlighted also by Kamiel Mortelmans, “Towards convergence in the application of 
the rules on free movement and on competition?”, Common Market Law Review 38, no. 3 (2001): 
613-649.
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If it is undoubted that in similar cases – and also in many others42 – the 
ECJ has recognised the possibility of assessing restrictive agreements even 
in the light of non-economic factors43, the question is whether protection 
of the environment could be included among these non-economic factors. 
Many scholars44 – and even the Commission45 – have tried to narrowly 
interpret the described line of case law, excluding the possibility of apply-
ing the same reasoning to justifications other than the ones already taken 
into consideration by the Court, and highlighting that the application of 
competition law would have been otherwise “transformed into the exercise 
of political discretion and choice”46.
42 In this regard, it is interesting to note that the ECJ has adopted the Wouters doctrine even in 
cases concerning restrictions by object: see judgment of 28 February 2013, Ordem dos Técnicos 
Oficiais de Contas v. Autoridade da Concorrência, C-1/12, EU:C:2013:127, and judgment of 18 July 
2013, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi contra Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato e 
Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato contra Consiglio nazionale dei geologi, C-136/12, 
EU:C:2013:489.
43 This possibility has been clearly stated in judgment of 9 July 2009, 3F v. Commission, C-319/07 P, 
EU:C:2009:435, paragraph 58, where the ECJ held that “the Community has not only an economic 
but also a social purpose, [and therefore] the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on State Aid 
and competition must be balanced, where appropriate, against the objectives pursued by social 
policy”. The approach of the ECJ seems therefore to recognise the existence of a “rule of reason” in 
the EU: however, despite the US-style rule of reason – which consists in balancing all pro-competi-
tive and anticompetitive effects of an agreement (and whose existence has been expressly excluded 
by the Tribunal – see judgment of 2 May 2006, O2 (Germany) GmbH & Co. OHG v. Commission of 
the European Communities, T-328/03, EU:T:2006:116) – the EU-style rule of reason only recognises 
the possibility, in certain circumstances, of assessing restrictive agreements in the light of non-
economic factors. It is however undoubted – as noted by Christopher Townley – that “by balancing 
in Article 81(1), the ECJ ignored the letter of the Treaty”, which allows the balancing in the context 
of Article 1010(3) TFEU. However, this could probably be seen as a solution adopted “in extremis” 
by the ECJ to ensure “that the referring court could achieve the ‘right’ result (or at least consider all 
relevant values) when it decided the case at hand”: see Townley, Article 81, 138.
44 See, inter alia, Loozen, “Professional ethics”, 28 and Odudu, The Boundaries, chapter VII.
45 See European Commission, XXII Report on Competition Policy (Luxembourg: Office for official 
publications of the EC, 1992), paragraph 77: “Agreements which restrict competition continue to 
be prohibited by Article (1) even if the parties invoke environmental protection in order to jus-
tify them”. See also Opinion of AG Fennelly of 11 May 2000, Hendrik van der Woude v. Stichting 
Beatrixoord, C-222/98, EU:C:2000:226, paragraph 28, “the scope of the Albany exception must be 
narrowly construed”.
46 See Heike Schweitzer, “Competition law and public policy: Reconsidering an uneasy relation-
ship”, EUI Working Paper Law 30, (2007): 5 and Odudu, The Boundaries, 170-173. Also, the World 
Bank and OECD, A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy 
(Washington-Paris, 1999), 1 consider that “there is no room for socio-political criteria such as fair-
ness and equity in the administration of competition policy. Such criteria are viewed as ill-defined 
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However, as other commentators47 have (probably, more correctly) 
pointed out, there are in principle no valid reasons to exclude the pos-
sibility of extending the balancing approach used in Albany and Wouters 
to cases where other non-economic justifications come under attention48. 
Indeed, the circumstance that the line of case law has (still) not been 
applied in relation to environmental issues (as well as to many other non-
economic policies) does not mean that the Court wanted to exclude such 
possibility. This is because the ECJ only rules on the cases that are subject 
to its attention. Interestingly, in its rulings, there is no general statement 
concerning the need of limiting the balancing approach to the areas of col-
lective bargaining and self-regulation by professional associations.
Still, this does not mean that competition assessment should always take 
into consideration all the non-economic justifications provided by the 
parties, nor that, in the balancing exercise, competition should always be 
regressive. If this were the case, competition policies would become (de 
facto) almost always inapplicable and, in any case, Article 101 (3) TFEU 
would lose any significance. 
As ancient Romans used to say, in medio stat virtus. Therefore, in absence 
of arguments that preclude a balance between competition law and other 
non-economic justifications (i.e. different from the ones already examined 
by the ECJ in Albany and Wouters), it is the opinion of the author that 
agreements, concerted practices or decisions of associations of undertak-
ings with an environmental aim and that determine an inherent restric-
tion of competition could in principle be exempted from the application of 
competition law49. In this regard, it is interesting to highlight that the men-
tioned case law could be invoked to exempt not only agreements aiming at 
and loaded with subjective value judgments, and therefore not able to be applied in a consistent 
manner”. 
47 See Kingston, Greening EU, 236-237. See also Christopher Townley, “Is anything more impor-
tant than consumer welfare (in Article 81 EC)? Reflections of a Community lawyer”, Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 10 (2008):361, who relaunched the balancing approach high-
lighting that “the Treaty requires public policy to be considered (at least those in the policy-linking 
clauses) using the Article 81 EC instrument”.
48 As pointed out by the same Commission, “it would, however, be wrong to look at the Community’s 
competition policy in isolation from other policies”: see European Commission, XXI Report on 
Competition Policy (Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the EC, 1991), paragraph 42.
49 According to Maurits Dolmans, “Sustainable competition policy”, Competition Law and Policy 
Debate 5, no. 4 and 6, no. 1 (2020), 10-11 “there are solid legal grounds to take account of climate 
change mitigation goals” when applying competition law that have been specifically listed by the 
Author.
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protecting the environment (and thus achieving one of the objectives listed 
in Article 3 of the Treaty), but also – in the light of the Wouters case – those 
decisions adopted by private bodies that pursue environmental protection 
goals (such as regulatory systems set up for environmental protection)50, 
provided that – in both cases – the restriction is “inherent” to the agree-
ment (i.e. in absence of the restriction, the environmental agreement/deci-
sion would not be concluded/adopted). 
Conclusion: a first alternative for integrating environmental issues in 
competition law
The analysis of the Wouters and Albany rulings shows that the European 
Commission has room for action in re-thinking its restrictive approach 
concerning the possibility of excluding an agreement from the scope of 
application of competition law. Indeed, the application by analogy of such 
case law to environmental agreements and to decisions of environmen-
tal bodies appears not only a reasonable solution, but also an appropriate 
approach in order to ensure the consideration of environmental issues in 
the enforcement of competition law51. Therefore, there is no doubt that the 
balance under article 101(1) TFEU could represent a first instrument at the 
Commission’s disposal to pursue the Green Deal.
3. Exempting anticompetitive environmental agreements under 
Article 101 (3)
Another way to integrate environmental issues in competition policies is to 
consider them within Article 101(3) TFEU. The third paragraph of Article 
101 TFEU exempts from the application of competition law those agree-
ments that restrict competition and fulfil four cumulative conditions: they 
(i) improve the production or distribution of goods or promote technical 
or economic progress; (ii) pass on consumers a fair share of the result-
ing benefit; (iii) do not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
50 See Kingston, Greening EU, 238.
51 See however Hans Vedder, Competition Law and Environmental Protection in Europe; Towards 
Sustainability? (The Netherlands: Europa Law Publishing, 2003), 321, according to whom envi-
ronmental considerations could be integrated only in Article 101(3) TFEU, while “with regard to 
the competitive appraisal on the basis of Article 81(1), environmental considerations can play an 
interactive role at best. Article 81(1) is about establishing whether or not there is an appreciable 
restriction of competition and this, of course, does not allow for weighing of environmental with 
competitive concerns in the first place”.
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which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (iv) do 
not substantially eliminate competition in the relevant market.
The abovementioned conditions (and in particular the first two, which 
have a “substantial” nature) seem broad enough to allow the exemption 
of an agreement on the basis of non-economic considerations (such as 
environmental ones)52, and in effect – as it will be described below – the 
Commission has done so in the past, adopting various exemption decisions 
on environmental grounds53, which have also been upheld by the ECJ54. 
However, it is also undoubted that with the decentralisation of the applica-
tion of competition law introduced by Regulation 1/0355, the Commission 
has changed its approach. The guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) 
52 As noted by Nowag, Environmental Integration, 35, “‘improvement of production’ and ‘con-
sumer benefit’ […] are [terms] sufficiently broad to allow an interpretation that encompasses envi-
ronmental benefits”.
53 It is interesting in this regard the analysis made by Christopher Townley on the decisions 
adopted by the Commission between 1993 and 2004, which show how public policy goals (which 
include the environment) “were decisive […] in over 32 percent of formal Commission Article 
[101 (3) TFEU] decisions”: see Townley, Article 81, 6. With specific reference to environmental 
agreements, a good review of the main reasons for granting the exemption could be found in 
the Commission’s Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements, OJ 2001 C 3/2 (the “2001 Horizontal guidelines”), which dedicated an 
entire chapter to agreements, distinguishing among agreements that: i) are not likely to restrict 
competition, given that they do not place precise individual obligation upon the parties, are only 
loosely committed to contributing to the attainment of a sector-wide environmental target, set the 
environmental performance without affecting product and production diversity or, finally, give 
rise to genuine market creation (§§ 184-187); ii) may restrict competition, when – due to the high 
market shares – they restrict the parties’ ability to devise the characteristics of their products or 
the way in which they produce them (§§ 189-191); iii) almost always restrict competition, when the 
cooperation does not truly concern environmental objectives, but serves as a tool to engage in a 
disguised cartel (§ 188).
54 For instance in Métropole Télévision, the CFI held that “in the context of an overall assessment, 
the Commission is entitled to base itself on considerations connected with the pursuit of the public 
interest in order to grant exemption” (see judgment of 11 July 1996, Metropole télévision SA and 
Reti Televisive Italiane SpA and Gestevisión Telecinco SA and Antena 3 de Televisión v. Commission 
of the European Communities, T-528/93, EU:T:1996:99, paragraph 118). See also Odudu, The 
Boundaries, 160 who – despite his criticism about attributing relevance to non-economic con-
siderations in the context of Article 101 TFEU – recognises that “non efficiency goals have been 
considered within Article [101 TFEU] in the past. This results […] from a teleological interpreta-
tion of Article [101 TFEU] […] through [which] the Court endorsed pursuit of a range of Article 
[3 TEU] goals, particularly through the use of the Article [101(3) TFEU] power to declare Article 
[101(1) TFEU] inapplicable”.
55 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1/1.
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EC56 specify that the sole objective of Article 101 TFEU is consumer wel-
fare57, thus ignoring the relevance of other goals58, and provide that the 
exemption should only be granted if “pro-competitive effects outweigh the 
anti-competitive effects”59, therefore only after an economic assessment of 
the conduct considered in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU60. This change 
of approach – which unjustifiably narrows the scope of the conditions of 
Article 101(3)61 – was motivated by the (political) need to ensure the uni-
form application of Article 101(3) by all national competition authorities62. 
Therefore, it could be assumed that, in presence of a political will to ensure 
56 See Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ 2004 C 101/97 
(the “Article 101(3) Guidelines”). As noted by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 
the European Parliament, Annual Report on Competition Policy (2018), https://oeil.secure.euro-
parl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang.en&reference.2018/2102(INI), “the narrow 
interpretation of Article 101 of the TFEU by the Commission’s horizontal guidelines has increas-
ingly been considered an obstacle to the collaboration of smaller market players for the adoption 
of higher environmental and social standards”.
57 Id., § 13. However, as correctly noted by Simon Holmes, “there is no basis for the adoption of a 
narrow ‘consumer welfare’ test anywhere in the Treaties – and therefore in EU law (or the analo-
gous national competition regimes in Europe)”: see Holmes, “Climate change”, 9. 
58 Such approach does not seem shared by the ECJ: see for instance judgment of 6 October 2009, 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission, C-501/06 P, EU:C:2009:610, paragraphs 61-63.
59 See Article 101(3) Guidelines, § 11.
60 This conclusion was anticipated in the Commission’s White Paper on the Modernisation of the 
Rules Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 1999 C132/1, where it was clarified that the 
purpose of Article 81(3) EC [now article 101(3)] was “to provide a legal framework for the economic 
assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow the application of the competition rules to be 
set aside because of political considerations”. According to Kingston, Greening EU, 263, “it is clear 
[…] that the Commission, in these documents, adopts a narrow economic view of the function 
of Article 101(3) TFEU, allowing balancing of competitive restrictions against efficiency gains to 
the exclusion of non-economic factors”, although recognising that such “interpretation is at odds 
with the EU courts’ jurisprudence and certain of the Commission’s own decisions, as well as with 
the cross-cutting provisions of the EU Treaty and more general principles of coherence in govern-
ance”.
61 As noted by Nowag, Environmental integration, 37, Regulation 1/03 – which, decentralising the 
application of competition law gave rise to the narrow interpretation – cannot change a primary 
law such as Article 101 TFEU. See also Holmes, “Climate change”, 11, “consumer welfare, in the 
narrow sense of consumer surplus, appears nowhere in the treaties and at most should only be part 
of a much wider set of goals focusing on both the competitive process and the core goals of the 
treaty set out above, including for present purposes, sustainability”.
62 The issue concerns the justiciability of the choices made by the Courts: some authors consider 
that “NCA and national Courts […] unlike the Commission, seem ill-placed to balance a restric-
tion of competition under Article 101(1) against a broad range of EU policies under Article 101(3)” 
(see in this regard Richard Whish, Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 169); 
against such approach, see Nowag, Environmental Integration, 37-44.
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a greater attention to environmental issues, the same conditions could be 
relaxed again.
Based on this assumption, the article examines the first two conditions 
of Article 101(3) in the light of the relevant Commission’s (and ECJ) deci-
sional practice. As for the third and the fourth conditions – which are an 
expression of the proportionality principle – these will not be object of the 
analysis, since such principle operates in environmental cases in the same 
way as all other cases63.
First condition: the agreement must improve the production or distribution 
of goods or promote technical or economic progress
As anticipated, the interpretation given by the Commission to the first 
condition has changed over the time: in a first phase, “improving the 
environment [was] regarded as a factor which contribute[d] to improv-
ing production or distribution or to promoting economic or technical 
progress”64. This was, for instance, the approach held in CECED65, where 
the Commission was faced with an agreement among almost all European 
producers and importers of washing machines (representing 95% of 
the market), aimed at stopping production and importation of less effi-
cient washing machines and at jointly developing more environmentally 
friendly machines. The Commission considered the agreement capable of 
fostering economic and technical progress because “reduced electricity 
consumption [of new washing machines] indirectly leads to reduced pol-
lution from electricity generation”66. Such conclusion was also emphasised 
63 For an analysis of the application of the third and fourth condition to environmental cases see 
Kingston, Greening EU, 280-292.
64 See European Commission, XXV Report on Competition Policy (Luxembourg: Office for official 
publications of the EC, 1995), paragraph 85. See also judgment of 15 July 1994, Matra Hachette 
SA v. Commission of the European Communities, T-17/93, EU:T:1994:89, paragraph 96, where the 
Commission recognised that “it is possible to take into account, as regards the contribution to 
economic and technical progress, [other] factors […] [such as] the maintenance of employment 
[…] [or] regional policy”. The Commission’s statement refutes the argument put forward by some 
scholars according to whom, from the analysis of the Commission’s decisional practice, it comes 
out that “environmental benefits [are] not part of the Commission’s reasoning, but fulfi[l] the 
function of embellishment”: see Halil Rahman Basaran, “How should Article 81 EC address agree-
ments that yield environmental benefits”, European Competition Law Review 27, no. 9 (2006): 479-
484. 
65 European Commission, Decision of 24 January 1999, CECED, 2000/475/EC, OJ L 187/47.
66 Id., § 48. More specifically, according to the Commission, the agreement was “designed to 
reduce the potential energy consumption of new washing machines by at least 15 to 20 % […] [and] 
7,5 TWh would be saved in 2015” and “the pollution avoided [was estimated] at 3,5 million tons 
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by Competition Commissioner M. Monti as the proof that environmental 
concerns were “in no way contradictory with competition policy”67.
A similar approach was adopted in DSD, where the Commission ana-
lysed the exclusivity clause included in the agreements concluded by the 
undertaking responsible for the collection and recovery of sales packaging 
in Germany (DSD) with the various local collecting companies, by virtue 
of which each of these companies was responsible for the waste collec-
tion in a designated area68. The Commission, considering the agreement 
“exemptible” under Article 101(3) TFEU, observed that it contributed to 
improving the production of goods and to promoting technical or eco-
nomic progress, since it “provide[d] for practical steps to implement […] 
environmental objectives in the collection and sorting of used sales pack-
aging collected from households and equivalent collection points. Such 
agreements [were] essential if DSD [were] to meet the targets and obliga-
tions it ha[d] assumed in connection with the operation of the system”69.
The approach of the Commission changed in 2001, with the adop-
tion of the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, where it was recognised 
that environmental agreements may well pass the test if they “either at 
individual or aggregate consumer level, outweigh their negative effects 
on competition. To fulfil this condition, there must be net benefits in 
terms of reduced environmental pressure resulting from the agreement, 
as compared to a baseline where no action is taken. In other words, the 
expected economic benefits must outweigh the costs”70. On the same line, 
Article 101(3) Guidelines specified that in order to fulfil the first condition, 
of carbon dioxide, 17000 tons of sulphur dioxide and 6000 tons of nitrous oxide per year in 2010” 
(CECED, §§ 57 and 51). As noticed by Monti, “Article 81”, 1075 “the economic value of environ-
mental assets is now just as relevant to consumer welfare as productive efficiency”.
67 European Commission, Press Release of 23 May 2000, “Commission approves an agreement to 
improve energy efficiency of washing machines”, IP/00/148.
68 European Commission, Decision of 17 September 2001, DSD, 2001/837/EC, OJ L 319/1. For 
an analysis of the case see Anatole Boute, “Environmental protection and EC anti-trust law: 
The Commission’s approach for packaging waste management systems”, Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 15, no. 2 (2006): 146-159.
69 Id, § 144.
70 See the 2001 Horizontal guidelines, paragraph 193. The Commission also described how to 
assess the benefits of the agreement: if consumers “individually have a positive rate of return from 
the agreement under reasonable payback periods” there is “no need for the aggregate environmen-
tal benefits to be objectively established”; otherwise, a “cost–benefit analysis may be necessary to 
assess whether net benefits for consumers in general are likely under reasonable assumptions” (§ 
194).
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parties have to submit evidences of the fact that the agreement produces 
“economic efficiencies”; differently, for “non-cost based efficiencies, the 
undertakings claiming the benefit of Article 81(3) must describe and 
explain in detail what is the nature of the efficiencies and how and why 
they constitute an objective economic benefit”71. Moreover, such new (and 
restrictive) approach has further been stressed by the 2010 Horizontal 
Cooperation Guidelines, which confirm the “economic approach”, but – 
differently from the 2001 Horizontal Guidelines – do not specifically deal 
with environmental agreements (except for a paragraph on environmental 
settings)72. 
This being said, the adoption of a more restrictive approach does not 
mean that the Commission has closed the door to the assessment of envi-
ronmental issues in the context of competition law, provided that they can 
be translated into economic efficiencies that make them usable in deter-
mining consumer welfare73. In other words, environmental agreements 
can still fulfil the first condition, if they are examined through the lenses 
of environmental economics74. In most of cases, it is possible to calculate 
the “environmental” cost (or benefit) of the agreement on consumers: after 
all, elements that have a relevant impact on the environment – such as 
71 See Article 101(3) Guidelines, cit., § 57. However, as noted by Holmes, “Climate change”, 19, 
“Economic progress is only one of four separate ways in which an agreement may meet the criteria 
of this condition (note the disjunctive ‘or’). There is therefore no need to translate all improve-
ments and progress into ‘economic’ terms”.
72 See Commission’s Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements OJ C 2011 11/01 (the “2010 
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines”). However, the Commission specified that the environmental 
chapter’s removal “does not imply any downgrading for the assessment of environmental agree-
ments” (see European Commission, Press Release of 14 December 2010, Competition: Commission 
adopts revised competition rules on horizontal co-operation agreements, MEMO/10/676): therefore, 
as noted by Kingston, Greening EU, 243, “the substantive principles set out in the 2001 Horizontal 
Cooperation Guidelines remain a useful framework of analysis in assessing environmental agree-
ments”.
73 This is what Hans Vedder considers as the “economisation of environmental benefits”: see 
Vedder, Competition Law, 321.
74 However, as noted by Giorgio Monti, “Four options for a greener competition law”, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 11, no. 3 and 4 (2020), 128: “A criticism of this proposal 
is that there are significant costs which may need to be borne in carrying out an environmental 
impact assessment. However, it should be recalled that the evidentiary burden of showing that 
Article 101(3) TFEU is satisfied rests on the parties seeking to benefit from such exemption”.
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pollution and Co2 emissions
75 – are quantifiable76. Therefore, even adopt-
ing the narrow approach of the Commission, there is no reason to con-
tinue to exclude such elements from the competition analysis: as advo-
cated by S. Kingston, “reasonable quantifiable, environmental benefits 
should be taken into account in assessing the efficiencies flowing from a 
transaction”77. This could be done by “internalis[ing] environmental exter-
nalities in competition analysis, within the measure of post-transaction 
consumer surplus”78, which, in turn, depends on “the level of remaining 
environmental resources and the ability of the environment to continue 
providing essential ecosystem services in the future”79. In other words, if 
an environmental agreement determines an increase of costs for consum-
ers, but such costs are fully balanced with a reduction in CO2 emissions 
(which, in monetary terms, is equal to the cost increase), then the first 
condition could (and should) be considered fulfilled80.
Second condition: consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting 
benefit
In order to fulfil such condition, a “fair share” of the benefits stemming 
from the agreement – and whose existence was ascertained under the first 
condition – should be passed on to “consumers”. But who are the “con-
sumers”? Only the customers of the good and services covered by the 
agreement or the whole society? And what is the minimum percentage 
of the benefit that should be passed onto consumers? The Commission 
75 For instance, see Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 304 who noted that “the current social cost of carbon with business as 
usual might be around $85/tCO2 (year 2000 prices)”.
76 This results in the so-called “true price”, i.e. “the market price plus the unpaid external costs”: 
see in this regard “A roadmap for true pricing” available at: https://trueprice.org/a-roadmap-for-
true-pricing/.
77 Kingston, Greening EU, 274.
78 Suzanne Kingston, “Integrating environmental protection and EU competition law: Why com-
petition isn’t special”, European Law Journal 16, no. 6 (2010): 801.
79 Kingston, Greening EU, 189.
80 As highlighted by Holmes, “Climate change”, 19, “an agreement [that] leads to the production 
of an engine that costs € 1000 with half the emissions of its predecessor which also cost € 1000 
should fulfil the condition”: as highlighted also by the OECD, “cost savings, innovation, improved 
quality and efficiency as direct economic benefits which are typically recognised in competition 
law analysis”, OFT Contribution to the OECD Policy Roundtable on Horizontal Agreements in 
the Environmental Context 2010 (24 November 2011), http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/ 
49139867.pdf, p. 11.
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has answered these questions, but the answers provided (once again) have 
changed over time. 
In a first phase – characterised, as seen above, by a broad interpretation 
of Article 101(3) TFEU – the Commission expressly recognised that the 
“environmental results for society would adequately allow consumers a fair 
share of the benefits even if no benefit accrued to individual purchasers”81. 
Such conclusion, reached in CECED, was justified by the fact that “the 
benefits to society brought about by the CECED agreement appear to be 
more than seven times greater than the increased purchase costs of more 
energy-efficient washing machines”82. 
While in CECED the Commission tried to make an economic analysis to 
support its conclusion, in DSD the fulfilment of such condition was based 
on a mere assumption. According to the Commission, the reduction in the 
volume of packaging – which was one of the objectives of the agreement 
– would have allowed “consumers […] [to] benefit […] [from] the improve-
ment in environmental quality sought”83. In this case, the Commission did 
not offer a definition of “consumers”, but this is probably because DSD was 
the only undertaking offering to German final customers a countrywide 
system for collection and recovery of sales packaging, so that “customers” 
were in effect the society as a whole.
The analysis of CECED and DSD not only offers some hints on how 
to interpret the notion of consumers, but also on how the Commission 
assessed the issue of the “fair share” of benefit that must pass onto con-
sumers. Indeed, the circumstance that in both cases the issue is curso-
rily examined is probably because environmental benefits are – by their 
(open and diffusive) nature – always passed onto consumers in significant 
quantities.
The picture has however changed with the adoption by the Commission 
of the 2001 Horizontal Guidelines first84 and then of the Article 101(3) 
Guidelines: the latter clearly holds that “consumers within the meaning 
of Article [101(3) TFEU] are the customers of the parties to the agreement 
81 See European Commission, CECED, cit., § 56.
82 Ibidem.
83 See European Commission, DSD, cit., § 148.
84 The 2001 Horizontal Guidelines (§ 194) distinguished between cases “where consumers indi-
vidually have a positive rate of return from the agreement under reasonable payback periods”, for 
which “there is no need for the aggregate environmental benefits to be objectively established”, and 
cases where “net benefits for consumers in general” are likely, which require a cost-benefit analysis.
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and subsequent purchasers”85, thus making a clear U-turn with respect 
to the Commission’s previous decisional practice. Such approach has also 
been confirmed by the ECJ, who stated that the benefits of the agreement 
should (at least, in part) arise in the same market where the restriction was 
found86, and that they should be directed “inter alia, [to] consumers”87 – 
thus confirming that consumers of the relevant market (and thus, custom-
ers) should be the final addresses of (at least) a part of the benefits stem-
ming from the agreement88.
Article 101(3) Guidelines also tried to give some guidance on how to 
assess the pass-on of a fair share of benefits, specifying that in order to 
pass the test “it suffices that sufficient benefits are passed on to compen-
sate for the negative effects of the restrictive agreement”89. In this regard, 
according to the Commission, environmental agreements could generate 
two kinds of benefits. First, they could result in quantitative efficiencies, 
when the agreement “lead[s] […] to fewer resources being used to pro-
duce the output consumed”. Indeed, in this case, there is “a more efficient 
allocation of resources” and therefore “society, as a whole, benefits” from 
the agreement90. Second, they could produce qualitative efficiencies, where 
85 See Article 101(3) Guidelines, cit., § 84. In this regard, the Commission also adds that “the 
concept of ‘consumers’ encompasses all direct or indirect users of the products covered by the 
agreement, including producers that use the products as an input, wholesalers, retailers and final 
consumers, i.e. natural persons who are acting for purposes which can be regarded as outside their 
trade or profession”. 
86 See judgment of 11 September 2014, MasterCard Inc. and Others v. European Commission, 
C-382/12P, EU:C:2014:2201, paragraph 242. However, see judgment of 28 February 2002, 
Compagnie générale maritime and Others v. Commission, T-86/95, ECLI:EU:T:2002:50, paragraph 
130 where the Court of first instance held to take into consideration “the advantages arising from 
the agreement in question, not only for the relevant market […] but also, in appropriate cases, for 
every other market on which the agreement in question might have beneficial effects”.
87 See judgment of 21 September 2006, JCB Service v. Commission of the European Communities, 
C-167/04P, EU:C:2006:594, paragraph 162.
88 However, according to Dolmans, “Sustainable”, 20, it is not necessary that consumers are 
“addressees” of a fair share of benefits stemming from the agreement: “Consumers who impose 
a cost on society – and thereby act unfairly themselves – cannot object on grounds of unfair-
ness if they have to pay more to reduce or compensate for that cost, e.g., when the externality is 
internalized. […] An agreement that restores a more reasonable balance of costs and benefits and 
improves fairness overall in accordance with the polluter pays principle must therefore by defini-
tion be deemed to allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”.
89 See Article 101(3) Guidelines, cit., § 86, where the Commission also adds that to fulfil the condi-
tion “it is not required that consumers receive a share of every efficiency gain identified under the 
first condition”. 
90 Id., § 85.
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environmental improvements allow to obtain “new and improved prod-
ucts, creating sufficient value for consumers to compensate for the anti-
competitive effects of the agreement”: in this case, the passing-on is gener-
ally presumed91.
Finally, a last element of attention contained in the Article 101(3) 
Guidelines concerns the possibility of considering “delayed” benefits in 
the assessment. According to the Commission, “the fact that pass-on to 
the consumer occurs with a certain time lag does not in itself exclude the 
application of Article [101(3) TFEU]. However, the greater the time lag, the 
greater must be the efficiencies to compensate also for the loss to consum-
ers during the period preceding the pass-on”92. This is particularly relevant 
for environmental agreements, whose positive effects – in terms of impact 
on the environment – are usually far from immediate, as they can only be 
appreciated by future generations.
Despite the narrow (and questionable) interpretation adopted for the 
notion of “consumer”, the circumstance that the Commission also takes 
“delayed” benefits into account confirms that environmental agreements 
are not precluded from fulfilling the second condition93. Therefore, the key 
element will be undertakings’ capability to demonstrate how some of the 
effects of the environmental agreements pass onto customers94. Indeed, 
the circumstance that these agreements – by their nature – are addressed 
91 Id, §§ 102 and 104. According to the Commission, in fact, “the availability of new and improved 
products constitutes an important source of consumer welfare. As long as the increase in value 
stemming from such improvements exceeds any harm from a maintenance or an increase in price 
caused by the restrictive agreement, consumers are better off than without the agreement and the 
consumer pass-on requirement of Article [101(3) TFEU] is normally fulfilled”.
92 Id., § 87.
93 Sander van Hees, A sustainable competition policy for Europe – LLM dissertation (Utrecht: 
Europa Instituut Utrecht, 2013), 46-47 proposes a reform of such condition in the light of the 
Australian model: the latter is based on a total welfare approach, which exempts from competi-
tion law agreements whose public benefits outweigh public detriments; a solution that would not 
require to prove “that efficiencies generated by agreements are necessarily passed on to consum-
ers”, and that could be implemented through a simple Commission Communication. Although 
the proposal appears very interesting, it cannot be ignored that the requirement of the “pass on” 
is enshrined in the Treaty, and therefore one can doubt of the possibility for a guidance paper of 
the Commission to make inapplicable one of the four conditions provided by Article 101(3) TFEU. 
94 Note that in case of agreements “promoting technical or economic progress” – differently from 
those aiming at the production or distribution of goods – it is hard even to identify the customers 
that are supposed to be the addresses of a fair share of the benefits stemming from the agreement.
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to the whole society95 is not incompatible with the existence of customer-
specific benefits. It should be highlighted that to pass the test it is sufficient 
that customers are addressees of some of the benefits of the environmental 
agreement, but not necessarily of those of environmental nature: there-
fore, if, for instance, the environmental agreement aims at creating a new 
household appliance which pollutes less and at the same time allows its 
customers to save on the power bill, customers will be addressees of a ben-
efit of economic nature; however, even limiting the analysis to environ-
mental benefits, it is likely that in many cases a consistent share of them 
is enjoyed by customers, who are the first addressees of the agreement96: 
for instance, an agreement for banning intensive breeding not only has 
an impact on the environment, but offers customers tastier and healthier 
food97. 
Conclusion: an effective alternative for integrating environmental issues in 
competition law
The analysis of the “substantial” conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU has 
shown how the same provision of the Treaty – unchanged since 1957 – has 
been interpreted in different ways over the time. While contesting the new 
and “narrow” approach adopted by the Commission – which, being the 
result of a political choice, could and should change – the exam of the case 
95 See, however, in this regard Vedder, Competition Law, 174: the Author – interpreting judgment 
of 27 February 2003, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
C-389/00, EU:C:2003:111 – considered that the “Court sees environmental protection as a diffuse 
benefit that inherently benefits an open group”, and therefore a measure pursuing such objective 
“does not confer any specific or definite benefit” to its addressees.
96 In this regard, Nowag, Environmental integration, 236 observed that “the lower the benefits for 
the individual consumer of the product, the greater the benefits must be to the society to satisfy 
Article 101 (3) TFEU”. 
97 Monti, “Four options”, 6 appears to be more sceptic about the possibility that an environmental 
agreement has good possibilities to pass the test: in this regard, the Author mentions the case of 
“an agreement by competitors to reduce the use of plastic in packaging fragile goods and replace 
plastic with a more expensive but sustainable material, then one must first inquire whether the 
buyers of the product gain anything by receiving goods that are packaged in a more sustainable 
manner. If no such benefit is evidenced, then the collective gain resulting from reduced use of 
plastic would not be relevant for an assessment under Article 101(3)”. Similarly, see Donal Casey, 
“Disintegration: Environmental protection and Article 81 EC”, European Law Journal 15, no. 3 
(2009): 376, who notes that Article 101(3) Guidelines do “not prevent environmental gains being 
considered as such within Article 81(3) EC, [but] only allo[w] environmental benefits to be taken 
into account as by-products of dynamic efficiency gains. It therefore precludes general environ-
mental improvements and pollution abatement simpliciter being taken into account”.
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law has confirmed that, even under such new approach, environmental 
agreements have good chances of fulfilling the conditions of Article 101(3) 
TFEU if the environmental effects of the agreement are considered in eco-
nomic terms in the assessment of consumer welfare. Therefore, the third 
paragraph of article 101 TFEU could represent another instrument at the 
Commission’s disposal to pursue the Green Deal.
Concluding remarks
In the light of the analysis made in the previous paragraphs, it is possi-
ble to conclude that the first and third paragraphs of Article 101 TFEU 
seem to offer the Commission enough room for a change of approach that 
enhances the role played by environmental considerations in the imple-
mentation of competition policy98. 
More in detail, the first paragraph of Article 101 TFEU allows the 
enforcer – in the light of the ECJ case law – to balance environmental issues 
in a manner similar to the one adopted in the context of the four freedoms: 
therefore, a restriction of competition that is inherent (and therefore, nec-
essary and proportionate) to an environmental agreement appears to be 
admissible according to the case law (although this was never invoked in 
the specific field of environmental protection).
Moreover, another promising path that can be explored is represented by 
the third paragraph of Article 101 TFEU: in fact, the wording of the first 
two “substantial” conditions is generic enough to include considerations of 
environmental nature; after all, until the 2000s, the interpretation of these 
conditions was very broad, and effectively included environment-related 
considerations, as the CECED and DSD cases demonstrate. In this regard, 
the circumstance that the Commission’s approach has changed due to 
political and contingent policy considerations (i.e. the decentralised appli-
cation of competition law, provided by Regulation no. 1/03) confirms that 
it would be possible to, at least, “go back” to the previous approach, escap-
ing the stricter interpretation adopted after the 2000s. This notwithstand-
ing the fact that – as it has been shown – even under the stricter approach 
adopted by the Commission after the 2000s, the possibility of obtaining an 
exemption on the basis of environmental considerations is not precluded, 
98 As put by Holmes, “Climate change”, 2, “It’s not the law that needs to change but our approach 
to it”.
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because environmental impact could be “quantified” and “monetised” 
and, therefore, used in the calculation of the consumer’s welfare.
For both paragraphs 1 and 3, the proposed changes only have an 
impact at policy level, with the undoubtable benefit that a Commission 
Communication that “formalises” the change of approach would suffice, 
without the need to wait for the previous approval of a legislative act by 
the Institutions (or, worse, for a Treaty amendment), thus ensuring a quick 
pursuit of Green Deal objectives99. In this regard, a good occasion could 
be the review undertaken by the Commission of the two Horizontal Block 
Exemption Regulations and the 2010 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines100, 
especially considering that the public consultation preceding the review 
has shown that “climate change and the corresponding challenging envi-
ronmental and sustainability goals” are the most important develop-
ments that affected the application of the 2010 Horizontal Cooperation 
Guidelines, and that environmental agreements deserved “a specific sec-
tion outside the examples given in the standardisation chapter”101.
The opportunities offered by paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 101 TFEU 
have been recently explored at national level as well, as it is shown by the 
Draft Guidelines on sustainability agreements102 published by Dutch NCA 
(ACM), which consider environmental agreements exemptible under cer-
tain conditions. It is of course desirable that other NCAs follow the new 
trend, giving more relevance to environmental issues in the application of 
competition law103; however, if this should not happen, the Commission 
should make use of Article 10 of Regulation 1/03 – a provision never used 
until now – which accords to the Commission the possibility to adopt 
inapplicability decisions “where the Community’s public interest […] so 
requires”, if “the conditions of Article 81(1) of the Treaty are not fulfilled, 
99 This approach appears in line with Ms. Vestager’s thoughts, according to whom “we don’t need 
new competition rules to make [the Green Deal] possible”: see Ms. Margrethe Vestager’s speech of 
24 October 2019, Competition and sustainability, cit.
100 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2019_hbers/index_en.html. 
101 See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2019_hbers/HBERs_consultation_sum-
mary.pdf, 8 and 16.
102 See https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/2020-07/sustainability-agreements% 
5B1%5D.pdf. 
103 In this regard, the new ECN+ Directive (Directive 1/19) provides that “National administrative 
competition authorities shall have the power to set their priorities for carrying out the tasks for 
the application of Article 101”: this provision could therefore help NCAs to pay more attention to 
environmental issues when enforcing competition law.
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or […] the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty are satisfied”104. Indeed, 
the advantage of adopting decisions on such legal basis is that they are 
binding for national competition authorities and national Courts105, which 
would ensure the uniform application of competition law, in a (hopefully) 
more environmentally friendly manner.
The exemption mechanisms provided under Articles 101(1) and 101(3) 
TFEU106 – in case, coupled with the use of Article 10 Reg. 1/03 (which 
could enhance the effects of the Commissions’ decision at national level) – 
could therefore be used in a complementary way to strengthen the role of 
environmental considerations in the implementation of competition law 
and, consequently, to give an effective contribution to the Green Deal.
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